For lack of time I dedicated myself to blog, but in return I give you a newsletter published by
http://www.cripto.es
this very interesting, I past I have. Jad on your phone to read it to me alone.
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Newsletter Arturo Cryptography Workshop Quirantes
http://www.cripto.es
Number 64 November 1, 2008
=============================================== =========================
EDITORIAL TOPICS
- More wireless
scares 101 CRYPTO
- Block Chaining
CRYPTOGRAPHY HISTORICAL
- Early cryptographers - correction
PROBATION - Spain recognizes its presence in ILETS
================= ================================================== =====
EDITORIAL
If there is something that kept me with illusion for some time, was that someday
Enigma machines purchased by Franco
appear as if by magic. I found one at the Military Museum in Madrid. The rest,
at least a good part appeared recently in the general headquarters of the English Army
. We will not discuss them today, but
little word of honor that soon will dedicate the space they deserve. Paragraph 
end, we come from Vienna news about the latest advances in quantum cryptography. In the one case as in
the other, the moral is the same:! Much remains yet to
ahead! Discoveries such as "state-of-the-art" (in usalandés
means something like "the Cutting Edge") succeed
month after month, and the surprises that keeps us still the muse of history seem
have not end.
between, we continue with news that, without being present,
related to events that we have already reported, are failures
wireless security developments or announcements cryptographic assumptions
to sell more. I think this newsletter will satisfy all because of
all speak today.
On the other hand, in "my belly and I," appeared this month
an article about the signing ... in a magazine as
bit cryptographic as Beyond, a monthly publication
occult themes. It is available on the Internet and take me handsome and all
(http://www.masalladelaciencia.es/historico-de-revistas/numero_236).
Later, I was interviewed by two radio stations for two separate programs
occultism, which makes me suspect that the belief that the cryptography
thing witch is still very strong. !
And Philip laughed when he accused the French cryptographer
Viete of witchcraft!
And just minutes ago, received news that José Ramón Soler
Fuensanta, friend of the crypto and this newsletter, will appear in the next program
Fourth Millennium. If this creates fashion 
I think we will have to retrain in parapsychologists,
take cards or something. For the moment, just then you have a wifi encryption article that by chance, is entitled "Wireless more scares." Criptoterror in pure ... or not. Happy Halloween I think we will have to retrain in parapsychologists, night.
<> <> <> <> <> <> <> <> <> TOPICS <> <> <> <> <> <> <> <> <> <> <> <> <> <> <> <> <> <> <> <> <> <> <> <> <> <> <>
<> <> <> <> <> <> <> <> <> <> =------------------------- ---------------------------------------------= <> More wireless scares =------------------------------------------------ <> <> ----------------------= <> Wireless networks are a security risk. The <> reason is simple: to reach them no more than put an antenna <>. Cable communications require that the attacker has physical access <> (or it is a government, and brandishing reasons <> security forces the operators to grant such access, but that's another story <>), but the airwaves belong to the first capture. The <> Soviets suffered in their own flesh. Believing that the microwave <> could not be intercepted from space, <> used to provide communications coverage its vast territory. The <> Americans, on the sly, managed a way to capture these waves <> launched into space a spy satellite network Ryolite and <> literally got boots for over a decade. <> <> The countermeasure is obvious: we encrypt the signal. And this countermeasure countermeasure to <> so is: criptoanalicemos the figure, we attack <> by brute force, seize any vulnerability in the system <>. The Soviets closed the window of vulnerability for years, <> aware of what was at stake. But what of all Internet users <> using wifi connections? <> <> Already in past issues we talk about failures related to <> WEP algorithm, used until now to encrypt communications <> wifi (WEP, wireless insecurity ", Journal ENIGMA 52, and some publishers
). Unfortunately, many telcos are still giving their customers
wireless routers that do not accept more than WEP, and the average user
that seems more than enough. Fortunately, we
the WPA (Wireless Protected Access), much stronger. Someday
WPA analyze it deserves. Today, however, we
to scare us a bit. Although WPA incorporates a process as
WEP encryption is stronger because it uses 128-bit keys along with a check
messages. A more advanced version, WPA2,
incorporates the AES symmetric encryption algorithm, and is fully compliant with the 802.11i standard
. It seems that there is no cryptographic vulnerabilities, unless
known to this day. So Why a company tells us that
WPA is slightly less than dead?
marras The company is Elcomsoft, a company with nearly twenty years
designing software for data recovery, or to
we understand, to break numbers. It's the kind of program you need
a user who has forgotten their password to open your document zip,
word or other types. Also specializes in forensic
software, which is espcially helpful if Mr. Grissom
want to read the messages that bad hidden on your computer. Elcomsoft's products incorporate
brute force methods (Try all possible passwords
) and dictionary attacks (
check if the password is on a list of commonly used words.) His
forensic programs even come to consider the entire hard drive,
develop dictionaries of possible passwords and try them one by one. Elcomsoft
(that, for irony, Russia) announced
days ago a couple of new features. The first is that the new version of its
key recovery program (Distributed Password Recovery)
now can run on a computer at a rate 20 times higher.
How? For by the ingenious trick harness the power of calculations
chips (GPU) graphics cards. We were all worried
how can the computer's CPU, and we fell in
not realize that now have graphics cards
devilish power. In fact, Elcomsoft says its program can
try more than one billion passwords per second. This means
try all possible passwords of eight characters in less than four
minutes. Are we beginning to scare ya?
Well, actually this is not a new problem.
already know that the computing power of modern computers increases which is a
lot, and not only them but also any other
pileup that can perform mathematical operations. In the 90's, I got <> simulate light scattering data by calling <> Mie theory in a spreadsheet, make a few months, a colleague of mine got <> using ... a mobile phone. From now on, <> zip encrypt documents, or Office, will have to use stronger passwords <>. What can we do today <> advance science that is an outrage. And while the full package of programs <> exceeds thousand euros of cost, too is true that there <> p2p networks and people willing to share. <> <> However, we have Russian Elcomsoft <> given a second shock. Or at least have tried. Taking advantage of the passes Pisuerga <> by Valladolid, hang off with this: <> <> "With the latest version of Elcomsoft Distributed Password Recovery <> (EDPR), it is now possible to burst the Protections WPA and WPA2 Wi-Fi networks <> hundred times fast ... just needs a few packets intercepted <> (with any network sniffer that can export data in tcpdump format <>) to carry out the attack "I mean, even dare to predict death <> WPA2, which uses 256-bit AES algorithm. <> <> Well, a couple of things. First, using AES <> great protection does not mean if all you use are keys to activate <> 6-8 characters, and here is the vulnerability of all that we protect <> password. EDPR looking WPA and WPA passwords, just as <> done in Office documents. <> <> Second, the attack is not new in the sense that it <> known to sniff some packets allowed in principle <> break the system. The question, of course, lies in the "in principle". The WPA <> need for activation, no less than 8192 calls to protocol <> SHA1, which means a total of 15 million <> operations. In a Xeon processor using the Aircrack program is <> can do about 650 checks per second password. With the increase <> Elcomsoft, perhaps reaching <> passwords 10000-20000 second, which means centuries to discover a password of eight <> letters.
words, you snack on your superprogram <> billion passwords in Office documents attacks does not mean, let <> least WPA is at risk. Moreover, what "quantum leap" means an increase <> twenty or a hundred? Much to me and my little laptop, <> sure, but there are great resources available to a user even individual <>. More seems to have wanted Elcomsoft <> media seize on WPA using as bait. Maybe next year they try to <> GSM telephony algorithms, "you can now tap phones <> hundred times faster." <> <> The problem is that some security consultants <> have fallen into the game. Or at least, one, one David Hobson, the company <> security consultancy Global Secure Systems, who in various ways <> Internet has been very concerned, to the point of stating that <> "decryption of WPA and WPA2 systems by brute force, <> using parallel processing has been on the horizon <> theoretical possibilities for some time." If you, dear reader, <> read between the lines, you've seen that and nothing is the same. It's like saying, if I play <> five numbers in the lottery instead of one, the possibility of <> I touch is more likely. <> <> not forget, moreover, that the password used in <> wireless networks can be much longer than eight characters. Mine has <> ... hmm, better not tell it you. There is no need to enter it <> each time you connect to our wifi network, and we can save with <> comfort in a CD or USB key for when you need it. The <> forward (so to speak) of Elcomsoft serves only to those who use a weak password <> and short. <> <> may someday see a method to crack WPA. A <> the long run, I smell the ease with which ether <> capture packets can eliminate these encryption protocols. But for now, WPA <> seems to resist, and we should not panic created by a company that sells software <>. <> <> <>
CRYPTO 101
=---------------------------- Block Chaining
------------------------------------------=
=-------------------------------------------------
---------------------=
There are two main types of symmetric encryption algorithms: from
and block flow. The block algorithms (Block Ciphers) operate
"blocks" of various bits, while the flow algorithms (
Stream Ciphers) operate on individual bits. A flow algorithm would
something like a taxi, as the traveler up shoots. For
contrast, the block algorithm is like a bus does not leave the station
until all seats are filled.
Both types of algorithms have their quirks, and today we will see the corresponding
block algorithms.
Most symmetric algorithms that sound are block-
: DES, IDEA, AES. Are assigned a key size, which is also the size
plain text processing. For example, DES has
a 64-bit key, or whatever it is, 8 bytes. This means that a message takes
M of 64 bits and encrypted using a key k encrypted
C to a block of 64 bits in size. Mathematically, we represent the algorithm
figure as a function E that depends
the message M and the k key: C = Ek (M). As the algorithm is
symmetric decryption function is the same as encryption, so that M = Ek
(C). Simple
here, right? However, when we have a message
longer, things get complicated. Of course, we can divide it into blocks of N bits
: M1, M2, M3 ... Mn. But now, the result of encrypting
Mn block may depend on the E and k as
key block cipher that we have previously. That is, the path will depend
tour bus 13 that have made buses
predecessors. The way in which this dependence occurs can affect the performance
the figure, but also, and more seriously the safety
system. Let's illustrate
. Surely more than a rare
has found that that the encryption of a block depends on previous blocks.
Why complicate life? Can we not simply encrypt each block
the key and leave us gibberish? Yes we can. In fact, that
mode is called Electronic Code Book (Electronic Codebook Mode
ECB). At the EBC, the encryption of each block is independent
, as if the other did not exist:
C1 = Ek (M1)
C2 = Ek (M2)
C3 = Ek (M3)
...........
Cn = Ek (Mn)
is the way that, a priori, it seems the most natural. Each block
plain text is encrypted independently, which is very useful
to encrypt databases random access, we do not need
encrypt the entire database again when we add, alter or delete parts of it
. It is the fastest way to encrypt, and the truth, one can consider the top
why even think that there are other forms of encryption.
The problem with EBC chained mode (ie, when there is no way
chained at all) is that it is vulnerable to certain
types of attacks. By setting concepts, consider a database with a client list
a bank name, account number, balance.
Suppose the cryptanalyst has access to the entire database
(which, according to the news about database theft, failure
vulnerability and accidental loss, is becoming less rare.) Say
somehow, the attacker has at least some of the information
the database in plain text. That allows
know, or at least infer from the data. For example, say
examining the database, encrypted, and verifies that there are different alphanumeric strings
repeated. Could this be
balances in round numbers? Maybe "928hng4l" means "ten thousand", or "kkwg972c is
a common name.
<> may, rummaging through my garbage, has been linked <> my bank account with certain ciphers in the database. I will <> simple as possible. Let's say that Monday, I'm the only customer of the bank <> making a withdrawal operation between 10:05 am and 10:06 am <>. The enemy access to the database and find out <> what has been the only line of the database has been altered. In <> that way, or better said, similar but more complex, an attacker can <> statistical studies on the ciphertext to obtain at least part <> information without knowing the key. <> <> following is the outline of an alternative attack. Imagine the <> Bank A sends an email to Bank B, which is detailed <> a transfer to a client of the latter. For some reason, all <> data packet is encrypted with the same key. <> data transfer is divided into blocks: one block for the name of the issuing bank <>, one for the receiving bank, three for <> recipient's name, one for the purchase amount and two the account number <> final. That is, something like EE-RR-DDD-M-CC <> <> Now, imagine that I want to get rich quickly. So I'll THE FOLLOWING <>. First, order a legitimate transfer <> EE-RR-DDD-M-DC from my account on my account A to B, and intercept. A <> then intercept a transfer of any person, <> say ee-rr-ddd-m-cc, I remove the blocks for the <> address and account number for mine, and shipping. That <> fraudulent transfer (say ee-rr-ddd-M-CC). Thus, an unknown <> (ddd) to whom I have the pleasure of meeting transferred <> on paper (well, on the cable) a sum of money M that neither <> even know myself. Look I do not know the key, not <> know who my anonymous benefactor, and not even know the amount of the transfer <>. Of course, sooner or later the receiving bank <> will realize that the issuing bank does not pay, will go to the customer and this <> will say it is up to you, but then I have emptied my account <> and I've gone off to the Seychelles, where <> I am writing under the assumed name of Arthur Quirantes. <>
words, the mere fact that a message is encrypted
not protect against various types of fraud. We can alter the data structures <>, mount denial of service attacks, the case is throwing <> imagination. Let's see how about this: take one of these transactions <> legitimate and reproduce a million times. The receiving bank does not know where it comes <> that mountain of money, but word spreads and trading <> fires, by contrast, the issuing bank <> sinks to the news of massive withdrawals of funds. She will end up <> returning to normal, but meanwhile I've lined <> buying shares of a bank and selling of another. <> <> right, banks are not stupid. There are systems <> putting in place to prevent such fraud. But the fact remains that <> enable encryption of data blocks independently <> is a security risk. For example, data blocks can be <> accompanied by a timestamp or an authentication code <> messages. Other applications such as databases can <> use random ECB smoothly. In the case of an encrypted partition, there is a procedure to see something <> later. <> <> can also go one step further and use the beam, it <> say, having idel message block depends on what she had in block i-1 <>. Of So if I try to copy and paste the balance <> Bill Gates, the result is a meaningless string. In fact, makes <> chained block cipher encryption block depends Ci Ci-1, which in turn depends on Ci <>-2, and so on. A problem that arises is <> that a failure in one of the encrypted block (for a bad encryption <> hardware failure, software or transmission) <> can spread to other blocks. Are known various ways of linking, each <> of which has its advantages and disadvantages. <> <> First we mode <> Cipher Block Chaining (CBC, Cipher Block Chaining). In the CBC, which is the block number is not plain text Mi <> but a "short" between Me and the previous encrypted block <> Ci-1: <> <> Ci = Ek (Pi + Ci-1) <>
In the above formula, "i -1 "is a subscript, while" + "
is an operation called XOR (Exclusive-OR). XOR,
applied to two bits, gives 0 if both bits are equal and 1 if the bits are different.
That is: 0 +0 = 1 +1 = 0, 0 +1 = 1 +0 = 1. If you look carefully, is a sum without
carry. This means that, in CBC mode, "xoreamos"
previous ciphertext block with the block current level, and what comes out
you apply the encryption algorithm. Operation Conversely, decryption,
is as follows:
Pi = Ci-1 + Ek (Ci)
We have already mentioned some of their advantages. As
depends on Ci Ci-1, we can not replace a block cipher by another without the result
go unnoticed. There remains the problem of two identical texts
subjected to the same key, gives the same text
encryption. Worse, two texts with the start will result in the same ciphertext
to the point where the differences begin.
This problem is very common for files with identical headings
(Word documents, letters stereotypical messages, e-mail etc), and
reminds us that even in today's electronic world is still valid
maximum to avoid regularities. No longer use the Enigma machine
not mean to start messages with "I have the pleasure to inform
..." be a good idea. To avoid this,
usual practice is to insert text at the beginning of a string of random data
called Initialization Vector (IV).
The IV does not mean anything, does not appear in plain text, and its sole purpose is to make each text
unique.
There is a price to pay. ECB mode, it was possible
parallelize the process. That is, if we need hundreds of data in a database
random access, we can cash them in parallel decipher. But
decryption in CBC mode has to be done in series,
manipulating data blocks one at a time. As for the propagation of errors, but there is little
. ECB mode if an error prevents a block cipher
read a plain text block, the same error in CBC mode affects the
block and a bit of the next block. Nothing more. It says the way CBC
Auto Retrieve, which means that after those two bad blocks
decoding system continues as normal text.
also be taken into account that an attacker can add blocks
of data if they are placed at the end of the text or message.
A common problem for the ECB and CBC modes is the timing. If
error, is introduced or lost a bit of encrypted data set
(for a transmission error, for example), the plain text obtained
illegible. If no techniques are introduced
able to detect and correct variations in the ciphertext, a single bit upset
make us the rest of the ciphertext in trash. There is a variation
CBC mode in which the plaintext can be encrypted in
smaller blocks. That is, if the encryption algorithm works
128-bit block, CBC mode allows us to encrypt in blocks of 64
bits, or 16, or even one. This mode, called Mode Encryption
Feedback (CFB, Cipher-Feedback mode), is more complex, but eliminates
synchronization errors. Another variant, called
Mode Output Feedback (OFB, Output-feedback mode), is more straightforward than the CFM
. Has the advantage that the error in a bit encryption
only affects a plain-text bit that closes the door to
some types of attacks, "but also timing errors:
a single bit added or removed in message encryption, and we are fried.
All in all, the recommendations of Bruce Schneier in his book
"Applied Cryptography" on the four modes are as follows:
- ECB. It is the most simple and fast, but also the most vulnerable
. Not recommended for encrypting messages,
- CBC. It is best to encrypt files,
ideal for software-based applications (like databases).
- CFB. Mode is "de rigueur" to encrypt data streams transmitted
where each character must be treated individually,
as the links between server and terminal. Often used in systems where high speed
can not afford
any error propagation.
- OFB. Very good in situations where there may be errors, and not the spread
.
Having seen, we understand that the ECB mode is less sure
, since among other things allows notice patterns in text
encryption. This allows us to better understand cryptographic
an article that appeared recently and has caused quite a stir. One of the applications
ECB encryption is encrypted volumes. Such bugs
are simply large files encrypted, to decrypt, it becomes
entire folders (including virtual drives) on your hard disk
. It is not feasible to use other modes
chain in this case because to do so the system would have to re-encrypt all
volume every time I edit a file from it, making
and a random access volume in a sequential access much slower
handle. Since
EBC mode, as we have seen, is vulnerable,
manufacturers introduce additives such as using a key switch for each position
volume, or otherwise make
encryption process, even with the same key is dependent on the position
encrypted volume. But let's be honest, how many
users of this type of encryption known such details.
myself I had to cram a book of Bruce tito, I admit. So if someone says
can extract information from an encrypted partition, we
panic.
Something happened recently when CB Roellgen, company
PMC Ciphers, Inc., wrote an article under the title "View
potential weaknesses of existing implementations of encryption in commercial software
record." The author shows how an image
encrypted in ECB mode allows you to guess the original image contours. To do this, take a picture
reduced to four colors: white, black and two shades of gray
. When encrypting with AES, we see how key characteristics of the photo
are still visible. The trick is that, when using ECB
pure and simple, uniform color areas
become the same shade of "color coded."
is, we are showing the truism that
equal plaintext blocks become equal ciphertext blocks to
time together. Of course, if you do not know the fine print, all you see is a picture
encrypted whose contours are still visible even more blurred
(which is that you take a
handful of bits to form a block to encrypt). When using a combined
ECB mode with a parameter dependent on the position of each bit in the
photo, photography becomes a set of random points without
patterns that we see. All accompanied
source so we can check if in doubt. Why
research published this obvious? In my opinion, to scare
. The author goes even further, says the following.
Imagine two encrypted volumes, the original (1) and an exact copy
(2). Volume 1 contains the picture, while the volume 2
not contain anything, only zeros. What this gentleman is that we
subtract two volumes (ie, do a XOR between each bit of
Volume 1 and the bit in the same position in the volume 2), and in doing
appears around the picture, more or less recognizable.
is not difficult to see why. If photography
only four colors, one of them is white, which represent zeros.
In Volume 1, therefore, parts of white photography
be encoded the same way as the bits of Volume 2 that are in the same position
. And, to make an XOR, the parts appear. In the article, take
black (subtract instead of add), but the parts that appear are the white
: the face of the girl and her shirt. The result will be the same if
use with a key ECB dependent
position because we are comparing bits in the same position in both
volumes.
The article itself clearly recognizes that "it is the logical result of encrypting information
identical with the same key." In fact,
this is only possible because the encrypted volume 2 was not created, but copied
, which gives it both the same key as the same initialization vector
(IV) of Volume 1. Have created the volume
2 independently and have left empty, this would have been
possible. After all, they often fail to create new volumes by
CopyPaste.
now is where is the motive. The entire article is focused on
present a problem and at the end of it all, say that there is a program called TurboCrypt
, the latest version avoids this problem. This man
works, as we mentioned, PMC Ciphers. And guess which company manufactures
TurboCrypt? ! Award!
The truth is that the whole issue of PMC and TurboCrypt is hilarious.
When I read the article first time, I sounded a little weird.
admit that I missed in the article, part of the roll
include source code (unnecessarily, I think), partly because of the feeling of being
reading about inventing the wheel. When I pointed to Bruce Schneier
about the article, his response was blunt: "They're just noticing when someone figure
patterns EBC mode. Nothing new ... and use
ECB is silly." The next day, posted the matter on his blog
(http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2008/10/new_attack_agai.html is
includes link to the article PMC) which qualified him as "an attempt
attract blatant advertising. "In 2003, Bruce
PMC spoke these words:
PMC Ciphers. The description of the theory is so full of pseudo-cryptography
that is fun to read. The assumptions and conclusions are presented
. Current research is specified
wrong or ignored. The first link is a technical paper with four references, three of them
written before 1975. Who needs
thirty years of cryptographic research when you
polymorphic cipher theory? "
polymorphic encryption"? Well, yes it sounds weird. In fact, so rare that once opened
page http://www.turbocrypt.com
PMC Ciphers started to smell like "snake oil." Americans are seen,
not rare to come across, first of all, with a picture of the usual
redhead cleavage (the same article, by the way).
can also be seen as commercial hype style phrases "final
tool ... any government agency of this world can ever
TurboCrypt burst." The competition seems less serious "break our system and give
a bundle, which includes the typical rant about possible keys cuantísimas
have to try to beat the system by brute force
.
But when we read the details of Polymorphic Encryption
(Polymorphic Cipher, or PMC) ... some details are to lie to
laugh, or at least one side of it is silly. First, it is assumed to
polymorphic encryption, 1024 bit
is so great that one can use AES instead if the user tolerates a lower
security "(TurboCrypt can be used with AES or PMC, and company claims that users prefer
PMC 80%). In another place he says that his
PMC is based on four strong algorithms (AES Rindjael, AES Twofish, RC6 and Mars
) of which the user selects one, then take a kind of password generator
and ready. In another place, say the system takes two passwords
and puts them in a hash function. Part of the result is used
! To compile code cipher machine!
TurboCrypt The most striking, in my opinion, is how
they are overreacting to Bruce Schneier. The link that invites you to break your
figure says "Try to do better than Bruce Schneier.
Break Polymorphic Encryption." Just above, another link leads to a note by the
company that, among other things, reminds us that the company they work
Bruce, BT Counterpane, "A competitor of PMC Ciphers, Inc. and
is unlikely that anyone with connections to the U.S. military
is really interested in making public encryption algorithms
really sure."
face attacks Schneier, 2003, PMC Ciphers
says the NSA uses its encryption system, so it has to be good, and that, as
to have done well and everything. They even support the owners
algorithms (ie, secret) and even suspicious of the figure
AES algorithm. Why? The NSA has proprietary algorithms, so they
to be a good thing. And even allude to market forces:
"How many individuals and companies are going to invest money,
time and effort necessary to develop new encryption technology, if
then give it away? Pure and simple truth is that capitalism, the potential for making profits
is one of the greatest forces
drive the development of new technologies. Delete this strength of encryption development
only make us weaker in the long term
view of the market storm hits us these days, do not think the argument
serve them something. And I hope that thing called
"toxic" does not refer to some snake oil encryption
companies.
Encryption HISTORICAL
=------------------ -------------------------------------------------- --=
The first cryptographers - correction
=------------------------------------------
----------------------------=
As some readers have noticed, the article "The first
cryptographers" last month contains some misprints. CopyPaste Imps did
of their own, substituting an "e" instead of
"L". Among other things, badly encrypted
atbash encryption, which should be as follows:
"The transformation of Babylon Sesac was replaced by
monoalphabetic called atbash."
monoalphabetic In a substitution, each letter is converted into a single encrypted element (which
may be another letter, number, a sign or any combination of the previous
). In atbash, it is replaced by a
alphabet written alphabet in reverse order. Using the current Latin alphabet, would
:
Plain Text: ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTU VXYZ
Ciphertext: DCBA ZYXVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFE
Thus Babylon became YZYQNKLQZ. In the Hebrew alphabet
, BABEL (BBL) become SH-SH-K (Sheshak or SESAC).
A similar transformation converts the inhabitants of "leb Kamai" in
"Kasdim" (Chaldeans) in Jeremiah 51:1. There in the Bible a second
transformation, called "albam", similar to atbash. Along with the
atbah, a trio of substitutions are known in Hebrew
since antiquity. For this reason, there can be a cryptographic
language as the "key" to encrypt and decrypt is known
unchanged. "
PROBATION
<> <> <> <> <> <> <> <> <> <> <> <> <> <> <> <> <> <> <> <> <> <> <> <> <> <> <> <> <> <> <> <> <> <> <> <>
=------ -------------------------------------------------- --------------= <> Spain recognizes its presence in ILETS <> =-------------------------- <> --------------------------------------------= <> [Excerpted from book "Probation" Nacho García mustard with permission of the author <>] <> Second <> Part One, Chapter 16: <> <> The April 10, 2002, José Luis Centella, <> Izquierda Unida deputy in Congress, submitted a parliamentary question <> ILETS Government and the English participation in this "seminar." Centella <> stated that "according to various reports of the European Parliament since 1993 <> Spain participates in international meetings on telecom security <> called ILETS" and claimed that "<> Congress of Deputies, so far, has not had any knowledge of <> such meetings, even though they had "attended by representatives of the United <> of Spain", so called the Executive to explain their involvement in specific <> ILETS. [1] <> <> The answer came almost two months to arrive. <> is dated June 7, 2002, but was not published in the Official Gazette of the Cortes Generales <> until 1 July. The executive said, trying to downplay <> that "ILETS is an informal meeting in which <> involved, since 1993, and by invitation, police <> countries of the European Union and third countries, and which is treated <> issue of lawful interception of telecommunications <> new systems. " Specifically, "officials attending <> Corps National Police telecommunications specialists and <> lawful interception of the same. "As to the English <> participation, the Government tinged stating that" agencies are represented <> invited, rather than individual countries. "[2] <> <> then explained that "within the seminar, there is a <> Permanent Technical Committee (STC) and a Working Group on Policy and Legislation <> (LPWG), whose work focuses on the sharing of national developments <> in the general area of \u200b\u200binterception of communications
, both from the point view
technical solutions, as in legislation. Also, these groups are
in constant communication with European standards agencies
ETSEI (European Institute for Telecommunication Standardization) and U.S.
CALEA (Communications Assistance Act for
Interception Agencies in the U.S.), where it is of
defend common positions, such as
Council Resolution of 17 January 1995 on the lawful interception of telecommunications
. The executive referred to the Council resolution which adopted the document
"IUR 1.0 "developed by ILETS.
As mentioned, this document was adopted in secret on January 17, 1995,
but not published in the Official Journal of the European Communities
to last 22 months, 4 November 1996 [3].
Centella also asked if a meeting was held ILETS
in Spain, to which the Government replied that "Spain has not taken place
ILETS no meeting as such but, in October 1998,
met in Madrid, in facilities of the Directorate General of Police
, the two above-mentioned Working Groups, "which came to confirm
revealed by Duncan Campbell on
meeting in Madrid to prepare the revision of the document "IUR 1.0". In his
response, the Executive also explained that these meetings
"is a work tool for improving the effectiveness
policing. So you try
participate in all meetings where topics of interest
police work for the purpose of being fully informed of technical advances and legislative
worldwide. " With regard to the need expressed by Deputy
United Left
for the Government keep Parliament informed on these issues,
response was blunt: "His conclusion is not subject to special requirements for communications
[...], or
terms of providing information as to the institutional bodies that
demand."
<> Finally, José Luis Centella asked about the adaptation of the resolutions adopted <> ILETS English law. Although the Government had already mentioned <> Resolution of the Council of the European <> January 17, 1995, extended this <> information detailing what is the usual procedure is followed: "The issues discussed are the Council <> Through the European Working Groups <> Police Cooperation, which includes many of the representatives of the agencies attending <> ILETS. "Thus, the executive was revealing that officials <> Working Groups Police Cooperation in <> the European Union, They prepare reports "ENFOPOL" are <> the same civil servants who also attend meetings of <> ILETS, which is especially important for the research that deals <>, as it confirms the relationship direct the FBI and NSA in the <> drafting of the documents adopted by the EU institutions. <> <> But of all the questions by Members of <> Izquierda Unida, the Government only left unanswered: Who <> organizes these meetings? Thanks to the European Parliament that we know <> ILETS was an idea of \u200b\u200bthe FBI in cooperation with the NSA. <> In its response, the Executive did explain that police officers attend ILETS <> "by invitation" and accompanied by their counterparts in other <> States of the European Union and "third countries", but did not specify what countries <> Above all, did not say the idea came from <> United States, the nation most responsible for global network <> interception of communications. Such data may not have much relevance <> for the English government, but also might think that hide <> preferred, perhaps because, increasingly, growing "friendship" with <> America. <> <> <> [1]. 184/027764 document. Written question to the Government. <> Official Bulletin of the Parliament. Series D, No. 342, April 24 <> 2002. P. 44. <> <> [2] Document 184/027764. Government's written response. Gazette <> Parliament. Series D, No. 381 of 1 July 2002
. P. 128 and 129.
<> [3]. NOTE: We have respected the government's direct quote, but <> serious mistakes in that paragraph. When it comes to CALEA, the Executive <> is wrong because that term refers to the Law <> Communications Assistance for Security Forces <> Americans, not a state agency <> standardization United States. Also, when the European agency quoted ETSEI probably <> case of a mistake in transcription, but the acronym is correct <> ETSI (European Telecommunications Standards Institute). ============================================== <> <> <> <> ========================== <> <> ENIGMA The newsletter is a free publication <> Cryptography Workshop, and is governed by the rules of <> Creative Commons license "Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike. <> is permitted free copying, distribution and communication for non-profit, citing <> name and reference. <> <> For more information, see Creative Commons license in their full forms and reduced <>: <> http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/es/deed.es <> http://creativecommons. <> org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/es/legalcode.es <> TO REGISTER: send an email to @ <> high cripto.es alta_enigma adding the words on the subject (subject). <> <> unsubscribe, send a message to the base address @ <> cripto.es baja_enigma adding the words on the subject (subject) <> <> To comment on this newsletter (doubts, questions, queries, reviews, news <>, collaborations, etc.), I am at your disposal in the direction @ cripto.es <> news <> <> Enigma Bulletin webpage (including back issues): <> http://www.cripto.es/enigma.htm
(c) Arturo Quirantes 2008.
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